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Abstract 
 
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in Quebec, using 
manufacturing firm data from 1997 to 2003 originating from R&D surveys, annual surveys of 
manufactures and administrative data. The estimated price elasticity of R&D is -0.10 in the short 
run and -0.14 in the long run, with a slightly higher elasticities for small firms than for large 
firms. We show that there is a deadweight loss associated with level-based R&D tax incentives 
that is particularly acute for large firms. For small firms it is not sizeable enough to suppress the 
R&D additionality, at least not during quite a number of years after the initial tax change. 
Incremental R&D tax credits do not suffer from this deadweight loss and are from that 
perspective preferable to level-based tax incentives.  
 
Résumé 
 
Nous estimons l’efficacité des incitations fiscales à la R-D au Québec à partir des données des 
enquêtes annuelles de la R&D et de la manufacture et à partir des données administratives pour 
la période 1997 à 2003. L’élasticité-prix de court terme est estimée à -0.10 et celle de long terme 
à -0.14, avec une élasticité légèrement supérieure pour les petites entreprises. Nous trouvons une 
perte sèche assez nette pour les grandes firmes associée aux crédits d’impôt basés sur les niveaux 
de R-D. Pour les petites firmes cette perte sèche n’est pas suffisante pour détruire l’additionalité 
des crédits d’impôt. Les crédits d’impôt basés sur la recherche incrémentale n’accusent pas de 
perte sèche et sont de ce point de vue préférables aux crédits en proportion du niveau de R-D. 
 
Keywords 
R&D tax credits, Quebec, price elasticity of R&D 
 
JEL codes 
O32, O38, H25, H50, C23
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Introduction 
 
 
Many countries rely on a policy of R&D tax incentives to spur R&D in the private sector. In 
some countries, the budget allocated to this policy is substantive. Canada is one of these 
countries. In 2006, the Canadian federal government spent about $3 billion a year on its R&D tax 
incentives program (Finance Canada, 2007). Among the Canadian provinces, Québec has been 
the most generous in its R&D tax incentives for many years. In 2005, provincial payments for 
fiscal assistance amounted to 538 million dollars. Tax incentives have the virtue of being more 
neutral in the type of firms and projects funded than measures of direct R&D support in the form 
of grants and subsidies, letting private business determine the projects and the amount of R&D. 
This virtue could also be seen as a weakness, in so far as it might be socially preferable to steer 
R&D towards projects with high spillovers. Many countries try to focus their support on small 
and medium size enterprises, which are, more than big firms, plagued by the market failure of 
financing intangible investment in the presence of information asymmetries. As firms rely more 
on internal funds than on external debt and equity for finance their investments, especially R&D 
investments, small firms might be more financially constrained than large firms.1 
 
A number of studies have been done to evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives in making 
firms spend more on R&D. The usual evaluation consists in checking whether there is R&D 
additionality, in the sense that private firms increase their R&D expenditures by more than it 
costs the government to support the tax incentives program. If per dollar of government support 
less than one dollar of additional private R&D gets spent by business, then public support 
partially crowds out private funding for R&D. The evaluation of the so-called “bang for the 
buck” is a rough cost-benefit analysis which generally does not take into account factors like 
spillovers, indirect tax returns, administration costs, and the opportunity cost of spending taxable 
income on R&D support.  
 
In the literature there are two approaches to the evaluation of the effectiveness of R&D tax 
incentives. The first approach estimates the treatment effect by constructing counterfactuals, 
                                                 
1 See the literature on the cash-flow sensitivity of investment following the seminal work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson 
(1988).  
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instrumenting the treatment, comparing experimental and treated firms before and after the 
introduction of a policy change, or by comparing firms that are close to a discontinuity in the 
treatment design. Matching estimators compare the average R&D effort of firms that receive 
R&D tax credits with the average R&D of firms that do not but that are otherwise similar, in 
particular in having the same likelihood of receiving R&D tax credits (Czarnitzki, Hanel and 
Rosa, 2004; Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros, 2008, Duguet, 2007). Instrumental variables 
estimators instrument the treatment by regressing it on a certain number of explanatory variables 
(Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka, 2008) or by controlling for the selected firms that know about 
R&D tax incentives and apply for it (Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros, 2008).  Difference-in-
difference estimators compare the R&D of firms in the reference and treated group before and 
after a policy change, in this case a new feature in R&D tax incentives (Cornet and Vroomen, 
2005). Regression discontinuity design compare the R&D of firms that are affected or unaffected 
by an exogenous discontinuity in the treatment function, for example just below and just above a 
ceiling in the conditions for being eligible to receive R&D tax credits (Haegeland and Moen, 
2007).  
 
The second approach is based on a structural model deriving from some kind of optimization 
objective a demand for R&D equation that depends inter alia on a user cost of R&D itself a 
function of R&D tax credit parameters (Bernstein, 1986, Hall, 1993, Bloom, Griffith and van 
Reenen, 2002, Mairesse and Mulkay, 2003). The structural modeling approach permits 
simulations of the effects of future tax changes and allows distinguishing between short-run and 
long-run effects. Given the endogeneity of the amount of R&D tax credits received and a 
possible distributed lag specification, instrumental variables estimations are used. 
 
This study evaluates the effectiveness of the R&D tax incentives program in the province of 
Québec. We rely on a modeling of factor demand similar to the ones adopted in studies that have 
opted for an estimation of a factor demand model for R&D with R&D tax parameters included in 
the user cost of R&D (as in Bloom, Griffith and van Reenen (2002), Mairesse and Mulkay 
(2002), Dagenais, Mohnen and Therrien (2004), Hægeland and Moen (2007)). We construct an 
observational specific B-index that enters the user cost of capital and that reflects the various 
changes over time and across firms in the R&D tax credit scheme in Quebec and in Canada. As 
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opposed to most other studies, we have access to administrative data capturing the real R&D tax 
support received by firms operating in the province of Quebec. For a survey of the empirical 
literature on R&D tax incentives, see Hall and van Reenen (2000) and Mohnen (2000). For 
previous work on Canadian firms, see Bernstein (1986), Lebeau (1996), Department of Finance 
and Revenue (1997), Dagenais, Mohnen and Therrien (2004), Czarnitzki,  Hanel and Rosa 
(2004), and Parsons and Phillips (2007). 
 
The originality of this study is that it exploits the actual R&D tax credits received by every firm 
instead of just relying on the statutory tax rates and eligibility conditions and attributing tax 
incentives to every eligible firm. Indeed, many firms may either not know of the existence of tax 
incentives (especially small firms) or decide not to apply for R&D tax credits because of 
administration costs, inexperience or apprehension in dealing with the tax authorities. The 
second advantage of using the observed payments is that it does not oblige us to collect data on 
certain types of R&D, like cooperative R&D, that would be difficult to get. The third advantage 
has to do with the fact that in the R&D surveys firms operating in more than one province may 
not always split their R&D by province wheras from the administrative data the provincial 
figures are declared automatically. Few studies in the literature have been able to make use of the 
actual payments of tax incentives (Brouwer, den Hertog, Poot and Segers, 2002; Haegeland and 
Moen, 2007; de Jong and Verhoeven, 2007, Duguet, 2007).  
 
Since the tax support is more generous towards small and medium sized enterprises, it is of 
interest to compare the effectiveness of this policy for SMEs and large enterprises. Lokshin and 
Mohnen (2007) report that small firms (with less than 200 employees) are more sensitive to 
R&D tax incentives than large firms in the Netherlands. Small firms are likely to be more 
reactive to changes in R&D tax incentives (at least if they actually apply for them) as they have 
more difficulty in financing their R&D. They have little collateral, they may be young firms with 
little to show in terms of success, they may not even have patents to signal their capability to 
innovate. The estimation of the model and the evaluation of the program in terms of R&D 
additionality will be done separately for both types of firms. We want to investigate whether the 
same holds for firms in Quebec. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the R&D tax incentives in 
Quebec. Section 2 explains the construction of firm panel data  resulting from the merger of  
three data sources. Section 3 sketches the structural model of demand for R&D from which we 
shall estimate the price elasticity of R&D. Section 4 presents and comments on the estimation 
results. Section 5 presents some simulation analyses of R&D tax experiments to calculate the 
ratio of additional R&D per dollar of tax expenditure for different modules of the R&D tax credit 
and to show differences in the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives for small and large firms. 
 9 
1.  Tax treatment in Quebec 
 
It should be noted that fiscal measures to support innovative activities other than R&D have also 
been implemented in Quebec. This is the case for the measures set up with respect to information 
technology development centres (ITDCs) and marketplaces for the new economy (MNEs) and 
other measures related to the knowledge-based economy such as the refundable tax credit for E-
commerce solutions and the refundable tax credit for technological adaptation services. This 
study, however, focuses only on R&D fiscal measures and we present below the fiscal measures 
that took place in Quebec in the last three decades, that is to say, the SR&DE refundable tax 
credit; the super-deductions for R&D and the refundable tax credit based on the increase in R&D 
expenditures.2  
 
Table 1 summarizes the estimated cost of the various fiscal measures in support of R&D that are 
in order:  
  
1.1 The refundable tax credit for scientific research and experimental development (SR&ED) 
(1983- ) 
This tax credit is the main R&D fiscal incentive in Quebec. Introduced in 1983, it was the first 
fiscal measure aimed at R&D in Quebec. As revealed in the appendix, the SR&ED has been 
modified a few times. At the beginning it was essentially based on the salaries of researchers. 
Later on, Quebec’s government put emphasis on both human capital and more intense 
                                                 
2
 As firms claiming R&D tax credits in Quebec are also tax claimants at the federal level of government, Revenu Québec arranged with the 
federal taxation agency, the Canada Revenue Agency, to apply the same definition for eligible R&D activities. Furthermore, to ensure the 
uniformity in its application at both, provincial and federal level, QR&ED are solely determined by Canada Revenue Agency. This definition 
complies with the guidelines of the OECD Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002). More specifically, Quebec's Taxation Act defines “scientific research 
and experimental development” by the systematic investigation or search that is carried out in a field of science or technology by means of (i) 
basic research or applied research undertaken for the advancement of scientific knowledge or (ii) experimental development undertaken for the 
purpose of achieving technological advancement for the purpose of creating new, or improving existing, materials, products, devices or 
processes, including incremental improvements thereto. 
It includes work undertaken directly in support of R&D, where it is commensurate with the needs of such research or experimental 
development and corresponds to engineering, design, operations research, mathematical analysis, computer programming, data collection, testing 
and psychological research. However, it excludes work undertaken in one of the following: market research or sales promotion; quality control or 
routine testing of materials, products, devices or processes; research in the social sciences or the humanities; prospecting, exploring or drilling 
for, or producing, minerals, petroleum or natural gas; the commercial production of a new or improved material, device or product, or the 
commercial use of a new or improved process; style changes; or routine data collection. 
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cooperation between business, universities and research centres in designing the tax credit. This 
lead to the following four measures: 
 
1) The refundable tax credit for salaries and wages of researchers  
It still represents the major component (more than 95% in the last years) of the overall fiscal 
incentives in Quebec. The tax credit can be claimed by corporations that conduct R&D activities 
in Quebec or that have such activities carried out in Quebec on their behalf. For example, in 
2003 corporations may claim a refundable tax credit that amounts to 17.5% on the salaries and 
wages they pay in Quebec in a given taxation year. However, for the first $2 000 000 of annual 
salaries and wages paid in a given taxation year, the rate of the tax credit is as follows:3 
— 37.5% in the case of SMEs4; 
— between 37.5% and 17.5%, in the case of corporations with assets between $25 and $50 
million. A linear reduction in the rate of the tax credit (from 37.5%  to 17.5) is applied 
with respect to asset increase according to the following formula: 
35% - {[(A- 25 000 000 $) x 17.5%] / 25 000 000 $}, A being the corporation’s assets; 
— 17.5%, in the case of corporations with assets of $50 million or more. 
2) The refundable tax credit for university research or research carried out by a public research 
centre or a research consortium  
This tax credit permits firms that conclude a university research contract with an eligible 
university entity, a public research centre or a research consortium to claim a refundable credit of 
35% of the eligible R&D expenditures. In the case where the research is done by an eligible 
university entity, a public research centre or a research consortium that is not affiliated to the 
taxpayer, 20% is subtracted from the eligible expenditures in calculating the tax credit. 
Entitlement to such tax credits need prior authorization.   
3) The refundable tax credit for pre-competitive research  
Under this scheme, corporations that enter into a cooperative agreement with non- affiliated 
corporations to carry out work on their own or to have work carry out on their behalf, under a 
pre-competitive research project, a catalyst project or an environmental technology innovation 
                                                 
3 See the appendix for the history of R&D tax credit rates in Quebec. 
4
 Quebec's Taxation Act defines a corporation as a SME, a business with asset, including those of associated 
corporation, less than 25 million. In addition, the business must not be controlled by one or more non-residents of 
Canada.  
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project, may claim a refundable tax credit of 35% of the eligible R&D expenditures incurred in 
Quebec. Again the cooperative agreement needs to be authorized by the government.  
4) The dues or contributions paid to a research consortium 
A corporation that is a member of a recognized research consortium may claim a refundable tax 
credit of 35% of its total fees or dues paid to a research consortium to conduct in Quebec R&D 
related to its activities.5 
1.2 The super-deductions for R&D (1999-2000) 
 
Introduced in March 1999 and withdrawn a year later6, the super-deductions for R&D were an 
alternative to the refundable SR&ED tax credits. Firms could choose between the refundable tax 
credit and the super-deduction. Firms with sufficient income were better off choosing super-
deductions in order to reduce their eligible business income to zero, and those with an operating 
loss were better off choosing the refundable tax credits.  Firms choosing the super-deductions 
could reduce substantially their net investment cost because the federal government applied 
different rules in the treatment of refundable tax credits and super-deductions for R&D. For 
example the net cost incurred by an SME for a $100 wage expenditure would be only $ 9 in the 
case of super-deductions compared to $ 27 if a tax credit were claimed. The super-deductions 
were withdrawn after one fiscal year when the federal government decided to apply the same 
rules in the treatment of refundable tax credits and super-deductions for R&D.  
1.3 The refundable tax credit based on the increase in R&D expenditures (1999-2004) 
This tax credit was announced by the government of Quebec along with the super-deductions in 
the Budget speech of March 1999. It was implemented for a five year period as part of the effort 
to increase the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP to the average performance of the G7 
countries. The credit applied only to SMEs, i.e. companies with assets below $25 million. Under 
this tax credit, SMEs could claim an additional 15% tax credit on the eligible R&D expenditures 
exceeding a reference amount equal to the average R&D expenditures for the preceding three 
years. SMEs that opted for super-deductions could also benefit from this tax credit with an 
additional deduction of 190% of their eligible R&D expenditures.  
                                                 
5
 There can be no double-counting : a firm may only claim one type of tax credit per dollar spent on R&D.  
6 In table 1, it appears in two years because firms use different fiscal years. 
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Table 1: Evolution of the estimated cost of fiscal incentives aimed at R&D in Quebec, 1997-
2005 
 
(Millions of dollars)  
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Scientific research and 
experimental development           
 Salaries of researchers 319 326 383 372 506 566 525 495 510 
 University research 7 6 6 7 8 7 6 6 6 
 Other 21 19 29 28 24 25 23 22 22 
          
Super-deductions for R&D - - - 55 44     
Credit based in the increase 
in R&D expenditures - - f 25 45 41 41 18 - 
Total R&D tax credits 347 351 418 487 627 639 596 541 538 
(-) The measure did not apply that year 
(f) The tax cost is less than CAN $ 2 million 
Sources: Ministère des Finances, Québec, 2005. 
 
 
2.   DATA 
 
 
The dataset used in this study results from the matching of three different microdata files: the 
survey on Research and Development in Canadian Industry (RDCI), the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures (ASM), and administrative data from Revenu Québec.  
 
The RDCI survey is a firm-level survey conducted on an annual basis by Statistics Canada. Its 
sampling frame comprises all Canadian firms known or believed to perform or fund R&D. Since 
1997, only firms performing or funding more than $1 million in R&D are surveyed. For all the 
other firms, the data are extracted from administrative data from Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA).7 The Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM)8 is an annual survey conducted by 
Statistics Canada that collects data on employment, wages, total cost of materials, total sales of 
manufactured products, inventories, value added by manufacturing and capital expenditures.  It 
                                                 
7
 For firms with less than 1 million of R&D expenditures, the R&D data come from Revenue Canada for firms that claim R&D 
federal tax credits. We have no information about small R&D performers that claim no R&D tax credits and that might 
nevertheless have some R&D expenditures. 
 
8 Starting in 2004, the Annual Survey of Manufactures has been amalgamated with the Annual Survey of Forestry to 
form the Annual Survey of Manufactures and Logging (ASML). 
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also provides other principal industrial statistics such as energy consumption and information on 
commodities consumed, produced and shipped. Contrarily to the RDCI survey described above 
that collects and reports data at the company or enterprise level, the reporting unit in the case of 
the ASM survey is the establishment. More specifically, the universe of this survey consists of 
all establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing activities, that is, all establishments 
classified in sectors 31, 32 and 33 under the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS).  Two methods are used to collect data, the data collected directly from firms’ 
respondents by questionnaires and the data obtained from administrative files from Canada 
Revenue Agency. Administrative data from Revenu Québec (ADRQ) comprises records of the 
amounts of SR&ED or other fiscal incentives to R&D effectively received by R&D performers 
located in Quebec or having had R&D conducted on their behalf in Quebec. This is a slight 
difference compared to the target population of Statistics Canada RDCI survey described above, 
which does not include firms that contract out their R&D activities. However, Statistics Canada 
and Revenu Quebec both use the same definition for SR&ED. The reporting unit in the present 
dataset is the provincial-enterprise, which is the same as in the case of the RCDI survey data of 
Statistics Canada. 
 
Matching was performed at the level of Provincial-enterprises9. The three files contained only 
firms located in Quebec. Matching proceeded in two steps: the RDCI data from Statistics Canada 
was matched to the fiscal data from Revenu Québec, and the resulting file was then matched to 
the ASM data from Statistics Canada. Another difficulty was due to the fact that the data 
correspond to different levels of aggregation. While the RCDI-ADRQ matched data are at the 
provincial–enterprise level, the ASM data are at the establishment level. To solve this problem, 
we grouped the establishments in the ASM data file by provincial-enterprises prior to performing 
the matching in the cases of multi-establishments enterprises. We decided to discard all cases of 
mergers and acquisitions. The data on the fiscal support received from the Federal government 
were constructed by using the official statutory rates.10 
                                                 
9 The notion of ‘‘Provincial-enterprise’’ is used to designate all establishments of a given enterprise within a 
province and in the same industry as identified by the 4-digit NAICS 1997.  
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Breaking R&D performers by size class in the manufacturing sector between 1997 and 2003, 
data show that most of the R&D tax credit applications come from small firms but that the large 
firms get the greater part of the amount of attributed tax credits. As shown in Table 2, more than 
65.3 % of all tax claimants are small firms (0 to 50 employees) making up 28.5% of the total 
value of attributed tax credits. However, large firms that represent only 3.6 % of tax claimants 
get more than 37.5% of the total amount of attributed tax credits. The tax credit for salaries of 
researchers was the most important program accounting for at least 75% of the total attributed 
tax credits. The tax credit for university research shows no significant differences across size 
classes. Tax credit for pre-competitive research was used more often by small and medium sized 
firms (less than 500 employees). The reason is that because of limited capacity of funding a 
research project, firms enter into partnership contracts for pre-competitive research projects (or 
to have the project done on their behalf). This tax credit and the credit for university research, 
however, represented only 0.9% and 0.6% resp. of the total attributed tax credit over the sample 
period. Concerning the tax credit for dues or contributions paid by corporations to a research 
consortium, data show that the majority of beneficiaries were firms with more than 500 
employees.  
 
Table 2 also shows the non-negligible use of other fiscal incentives such as the super-deductions 
for R&D and the tax credit based on the increase in R&D expenditures. Even though these fiscal 
measures lasted only 1 and 5 years respectively, corresponding claims totaled 4.0% and 4.5% 
respectively of the total attributed tax credits over the sample period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 The main difficulty encountered in matching the RDCI/ADRQ and ASM datasets is that they do not have a 
unique identifier. While Statistics Canada uses the company number to identify establishments in the RCDI file, 
Revenu Quebec uses a different identifier called NEQ (numéro d’entreprise du Quebéc). However, since the file 
from Statistics Canada includes the names and addresses of the surveyed firms, the NEQ was obtained from the 
registry of enterprises from Quebec’s Inspector General of Financial Institutions (IGIF). We were confronted with 
the problem that the company names could sometimes differ because of translation or transcript errors. After 2000, 
at least 93% of the firms in the RDCI/ADRQ file could be matched with the ASM file, before 2000 only 69% to 
77% of the firms could be matched. In terms of total R-D, the totals from RDCI and the matched data hardly differ. 
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Table 2: Use of Quebec’s R&D tax credits by class size in the manufacturing sector (% of firms), 1997-2003  
Fiscal incentives for R&D in Quebec 
Tax 
credits 
claimants 
Value of 
tax credits   
Salaries of 
researchers 
University 
research 
Pre-
competitive 
research 
Research 
consortium 
Credit based 
on the 
increase in 
R&D 
expenditures 
Super-
deductions 
for R&D Other 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
( %) 
≥ 500 employees  3.9 37.5  75.6 0.8 0.4 5.0 0.0 7.5 10.8 
250 to 499 employees 4.2 7.6  87.2 0.3 3.6 0.7 0.5 2.1 5.6 
50 to 249 employees 28.2 26.4  85.6 0.8 0.7 0.1 5.8 2.5 4.6 
< 50 employeees 63.7 28.5  86.5 0.5 1.1 0.0 10.2 1.3 0.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0  82.2 0.6 0.9 2.0 4.5 4.0 5.8 
Sources: Ministry of Revenue of Quebec and Statistics Canada, compiled by the Institut de la Statistique du Québec and by the authors 
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3.  MODEL  
 
The model from which we estimate the elasticity of R&D with respect to its user cost is the 
same as the one used in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007). In a nutshell, we start from a CES 
approximation to the true production function for firm i  at time t (as in Chirinko et al., 1999; 
Hall and van Reenen, 2000; Mairesse and Mulkay, 2004): 
 
ρνρρ ββγ /])1([),( −−− −+== itititittit XKXKFQ                                                                    (1) 
 
where itQ is the output, itK  is the end of period R&D stock, itX  is the other inputs, and γ (a 
scale factor), β  (the distribution parameter),  ν (a measure of the returns to scale) are 
parameters to be estimated that characterize the technology, as well as ρ that enters the 
expression for the elasticity of substitution (σ ) between R&D stock and the other inputs and 
is given by .0)1/(1 ≥+= ρσ  In a static model of profit maximization, the optimal amount of 
R&D capital in logarithms would be given by11  
 
)()/)1((
,,
*
itQitRitit puqak −−−++= σνσσ .           (2) 
 
where itRu , is the logarithm of the user cost of R&D and itQp , the unobservable output price.  
Following Klette and Griliches (1996) we assume a price elasticity of 0>ε  in absolute value 
of the demand for the output of firm i relative to industry demand: 
 
)(
, ItitQItit ppqq −−=− ε              (3) 
 
where Itq  is the industry demand and Itp the industry price in period t .Substituting (3) into 
(2) yields the long-run relationship  
 
tIitIitRitit qpuvak ,,,
* )( γσφ +−−+=                          (4) 
                                                 
11 Logarithmically-transformed variables are denoted by small letters. 
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where νσµσφ /)1( −+= , and v/)1)(1( σµγ −−= , and itv is the nominal output deflated by 
the industry output price deflator. 
 
Investment is composed of a replacement investment ( ritR ) and a net investment ( nitR ). The 
former is proportional to the R&D stock at the beginning of the period: 1, −= ti
r
it KR δ . The 
latter represents the change in the R&D stock: .1, −−= tiit
n
it KKR Hence we can write 
 
1,1,1, −−−
∆
+=
+
=
ti
it
ti
n
it
r
it
ti
it
K
K
K
RR
K
R δ .                    (5) 
 
We approximate the discrete growth rate in the R&D stock by a log difference and assume 
that the growth rate in the R&D stock follows a partial adjustment mechanism 
 
        (6) 
 
 
which after substitutions can be rewritten as  
 
...)()1()()1()( * 3* 22* 2* 1* 1*1 +−−+−−+−=− −−−−−− tttttttt kkkkkkkk λλλλλ       (7) 
 
Changes in the R&D stock are therefore expressed as a weighted sum of changes in the 
desired R&D stocks in the past. We can now rewrite (5) as 
 
it
IitIitRitit
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dq
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                              (8) 
 
or as 
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)( 1*1 −− −=− tttt kkkk λ
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We have appended a random error term in (9) to account for random unobserved 
disturbances. Any individual effect present in (4) is removed by the first-differencing. The 
error term follows a MA(1) process. Because of the simultaneity between the user cost and 
the amount of R&D we have to instrument for the contemporaneous change in the user cost 
of R&D. The short-run elasticity of R&D stock with respect to the user cost of R&D is given 
by σλ− . The long-run elasticity is given by σ− .  
 
4. Estimation results 
 
 
Table 3 gives the magnitude of the variables appearing in the final estimating equation (9). 
The R&D stock has been constructed by the perpetual inventory method, the starting value 
being obtained by dividing the initial R&D flow by the sum of the R&D depreciation rate 
(taken to be 15%) and the growth rate of R&D flow during the sample period. The R&D 
stock is on average 5 times bigger than the R&D flow. All nominal values are converted in 
2002 prices by the appropriate deflators. The R&D deflator is computed as the average of the 
GDP deflator and the monthly wage index of the manufacturing sector in Quebec (Statistics 
Canada, Cansim, table 281-0039). The industry price and quantity used to eliminate the firm 
output in equation (3) is from the NAICS 3-digit industry in which the firm has its major 
activity. 
 
 
Table 3. Variable constructions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Construction All firms Large 
firms 
Small 
firms 
KR  Ratio of R&D flow to R&D stock, constructed 
as own R&D expenditures divided by R&D 
stock at the beginning of the period 
0.24 
(0.25) 
0.25 
(0.25) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
u  User cost of R&D deflated by the industry 
output deflator 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
v  Firm sales in real terms, in logarithm 15.31 
(1.73) 
14.85 
(1.42) 
17.64 
(1.17) 
Iq  Industry sales  (at 4-digit NAICS classification), in logarithm 
21.65 
(0.64) 
21.65 
(0.63) 
21.67 
(0.65) 
u∆  Log-difference in user cost of R&D deflated by 
industry output deflator 
0.24 
(0.26) 
0.26 
(0.27) 
0.13 
(0.22) 
v∆  Log-difference in firms’ real sales 0.08 
(0.52 ) 
0.09 
(0.50) 
0.03 
(0.58) 
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Iq∆  Log-difference in industry real sales 0.03 (0.19) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
K  R&D stock, in million 2002 CAN$ 4.36 
(39.50 ) 
10.34 
(22.64) 
21.20 
(95.30) 
Note: The descriptive statistics are sample means for the years 1997-2003. The base year is 2002. 
 
 
In table 4 we present the GMM estimates for all firms in our sample, and separately for the 
large firms (with more than 250 employees) and the small firms (with less than 250 
employees). As we can see, most of the firms in our sample are small, benefiting from 
favourable R&D tax credits. We have relatively few large firms in our sample. Two 
explanatory variables have to be instrumented: the user cost of R&D, which may vary with 
the amount of R&D, and the lagged dependent variable, which is correlated with the MA(1) 
error term. Without instrumenting, i.e. estimating equation (9) by ordinary least squares, 
yields a short-run price elasticity σλ−  of -0.01 (non-significant). We then turn to the GMM 
estimations. As instrumental variables we use the one-period lagged level of the user cost of 
R&D (in log), the two-period lagged level of the dependent variable, and the 
contemporaneous R&D deflator, interest rate and tax credit on researchers’ salaries in 
Quebec.   
 
The rank test of underidentification rejects the null hypothesis that the matix of reduced form 
coefficients has less than full rank, and hence points to the relevance of the instruments and 
to the identification of the model with those instruments. Regarding the weakness of the 
instruments, the F-test based on Shea’s partial R2 is greater than 10 for the first-stage 
significance of the exogenous variables in explaining the user cost of R&D but less than 10 
in explaining the lagged dependent variable. However, in the presence of two endogenous 
variables we should rather use the Cragg Donald statistic (the minimum eigenvalue of the 
first stage F-statistic matrix) and the Stock and Yogo (2002) critical values for testing 
whether the instruments are weak 1) in terms of relative bias, i.e. whether the maximum 
relative squared bias of the IV estimator relative to the OLS estimator is at least some value 
b, and 2) in terms of bias in the Wald test size, i.e. whether the actual size of the test is at 
least some value b above the nominal level of the test. At the 5% level, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments bias the IV estimate relative to the OLS estimate by more 
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than 30% and we do not even reject the null that the bias in the size of the Wald test exceeds 
30%. With our instruments the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is accepted. We 
have explored with different additional instruments (the lagged value of sales in logarithms, 
the Federal incremental tax credit rate, the ratio of log assets over log employees, and the 
ratio of growth in output over growth in employment).  In each case the test of 
overidentifying restrictions was rejected. We thus conclude that our instruments are rather 
weak, but that at least they fulfill the overidentifying restrictions. 
   
The speed of adjustment in the desired R&D stock λ is equal to 0.74 for small firms and 0.57 
for large firms, although statistically speaking they are not significantly different from each 
other. The short-run price elasticity of R&D is -0.14 for small firms and not significantly 
different from zero for large firms. It may be that large firms are not very price responsive, 
but it may also be that our sample size is too small for large firms to yield significant 
coefficients. For the whole sample, however, the short-run price elasticity is significantly 
different from zero and lower than for the subsample of small firms. Small firms do hence 
seem to be somewhat more price responsive than large firms.  The long-run price elasticity σ 
is equal to -0.19 for small firms and -0.14 for the whole sample. The long-run output price 
elasticity is equal to 0.03 for small firms and 0.07 for large firms. From the constant term in 
the regression we can recover the estimated R&D depreciation rate, which turns out to be 
between 17% and 27%, thus not far away from our ad hoc choice of 15%. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimation of R&D equation (9) by GMM 
 
Parameters/statistics OLS GMM 
 All firms All firms Large firms Small firms 
     
λ−1  0.259*** 
(0.031) 
0,277*** 
(0,102) 
0,430*** 
(0,084) 
0,256** 
(0,116) 
σλ−  -0.011 
(0.017) 
-0,104*** 
(0,035) 
-0,058 
(0,043) 
-0,142*** 
(0,044) 
φλ  0.018* 
(0.009) 
0,028** 
(0,011) 
0,039** 
(0,018) 
0,025* 
(0,013) 
γλ  -0.020 
(0.020) 
-0,046* 
(0,024) 
-0,034 
(0,045) 
-0,047 
(0,029) 
δλ  0.166*** 0,177*** 0,098*** 0,198*** 
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(0.009) (0,023) (0,020) (0,026) 
     
LR price elasticity -0.044 
(0.065) 
-0,144** 
(0,062) 
-0,102 
(0,082) 
-0,191** 
(0,081) 
LR output elasticity 0.069* 
(0.037) 
0,039** 
(0,015) 
0,069** 
(0,032) 
0,033* 
(0,017) 
Test of underidentification 
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM 
statistic (p-value) 
 10.238 
(0.036) 
 8.230 
(0.084) 
Tests of weak identification: 
F-test of Shea’s partial R2  for 
IitRit dpdu −  
2,1, / −− titi KR  
 
  
 
 
107.55 
11.58 
 
 
 
 
64.30 
6.11 
 
 
 
 
63.21 
9.52 
 
 
Cragg-Donald F statistic 
(at 5% level of confidence)  
         . IV relative bias to OLS 
         . size bias 
 
 5.893 
 
Rejected >30% 
Not rejected 
>30% 
5.371 
 
Rejected >30% 
Not rejected 
>30% 
4.986 
 
Rejected >30% 
Not rejected 
>30% 
test of overidentification: 
Hansen J-statistic  
(p-value) 
 5,043 
(0,169) 
1,166 
(0,761) 
4,305 
(0,230) 
Number of observations 1386 1386 264 1122 
Notes: Estimation period is 1998-2003.   
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Standard errors of the long-run elasticities are computed using the delta method. Heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
We have also experimented with an alternative modeling of the dynamics in the R&D 
investment by specifying an error-correction model with an autoregressive distributed lag 
specification ALD(1,1) following Mairesse and Mulkay (2004). This specification does not 
assume a particular type of adjustement as we do in the above model. However, the 
alternative model did not yield a significant price elasticity of R&D. Maybe a higher-order 
lagged specification would be required but our short time interval does not allow us to do 
this. Finally, we could think of estimating a different sensitivity to R&D tax credits between 
small and large firms by exploiting a regression discontinuity design, in the sense that the 
user cost of R&D would be lower for small firms that benefit from more generous R&D tax 
credits. The number of firms falling in a close neighbourhood of the discontinuity in the 
R&D tax credit schedule, some falling just above and some just below $2 ML of R&D wages 
was too small to find good matches to compare the treatment effect of both types of firm.  
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5. Measuring effectiveness of R&D 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the whole R&D tax incentive program we compare the 
present situation with a fictive scenario where the government changes part of the R&D tax 
incentive scheme. In the absence of a proper cost-benefit calculation, including all indirect 
costs and benefits related to such a program (administration costs, opportunity costs and 
externalities), the usual way to assess the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives consists in 
computing the so-called “bang for the buck” (BFTB). By that is meant how much private 
R&D increases per dollar of R&D tax receipts foregone. If it is greater than 1, R&D tax 
incentives are considered to be effective in stimulating additional R&D; a value smaller than 
1 means that part of the money received from tax incentives substitutes for private financing.  
 
We start from an old scenario where firms invest in R&D every year to keep the R&D stock 
constant and/or to expand that stock. In the new scenario the government decides to increase 
the tax incentives, which leads to a decrease in the user cost of R&D and to increases in the 
R&D stock of knowledge until a new desired R&D stock is reached. As firms invest more in 
R&D, government needs to spend more on R&D tax incentives. In table 5 we describe the 
evolution of the flows and stocks of R&D before and after the change in R&D tax credits 
(the stocks and flows in the new scenario are denoted by ~). In principle, given our assumed 
partial adjustment process, it takes until infinity to reach the new steady state, but in practice 
the new optimal stock is reached after 15 to 20 years.  
 
 
Table 5.  Trajectory of R&D flows and stocks under two scenarios 
 
 Old scenario  
 
New scenario 
(after a change in the R&D tax credits) 
periods R&D flow R&D 
stock 
R&D flow  R&D stock 
0 
0R  0K  0R  0K  
1 )( 0101 KKKR −+= δ  1K  )~(~ 0101 KKKR −+= δ  11111 )/(~ RR uuKKK ∆∂∂+=  
2 )( 1212 KKKR −+= δ  2K  )~~(~~ 1212 KKKR −+= δ  1121212 )/()(
~~
RR uuKKKKK ∆∂∂+−+=  
3 )( 2323 KKKR −+= δ  3K  )~~(~~ 2323 KKKR −+= δ  1132323 )/()(
~~
RR uuKKKKK ∆∂∂+−+=  
4 . . . . 
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t )( 11 −− −+= tttt KKKR δ  tK  )~~(~~ 11 −− −+= tttt KKKR δ  1111 )/()(
~~
RRttttt uuKKKKK ∆∂∂+−+= −−  
 Notes: The derivative Rj uK ∂∂ /  represents the change in desired R&D stock that occurs j-1 periods after the 
change in the user cost of R&D caused by a change in the tax incentives in period 0 ( 0Ru∆ ). For simplicity, here 
the firm subscript i has been omitted.  
 
 
To find out how much R&D arises from an R&D tax incentive scheme, we have to compute 
the differences in R&D flows (or expenditures) from period 1 onwards till infinity between 
the two scenarios, where the flows of each additional year are discounted by 1/(1+r) vis-à-vis 
the previous year.  This in our particular model is equal to12 
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where σλ−  is the estimated short-run user cost elasticity of R&D stock in the first period, λ  
is the estimated partial adjustment coefficient, δ is the depreciation rate of the R&D stock, 
taken to be 15%,  r is the risk-free interest rate, taken to be on average 3%, and where the 
user cost elasticity, common to all firms of a given size class and constant over time, is 
converted to a marginal effect for period t using the optimal R&D stock and the user cost of 
R&D of period t. 
  
 
For every dollar of private R&D expenditure the government supports a fraction of it by 
giving tax incentives in proportion to the wage and salary costs for researchers, the fraction 
                                                 
12
  See Lokshin-Mohnen (2007) for a detailed derivation of (10). 
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of R&D carried out by a public research centre, the fraction carried out in a research 
consortium, the fraction of pre-competitive research, or the increments of R&D with respect 
to a base year. Let us denote the fraction of the private R&D so supported by the tax 
incentive program for firm i at year t by itit RR ∆+ 21 γγ , where 1γ  is the R&D tax credit rate 
in proportion of the level of R&D and 2γ  the rate in proportion of the increase in R&D. 
Appendix A explains in detail the various rates that apply in Quebec. Table A.1 lists for 
every year the average user cost of R&D, the B-index and its components, and what the user 
cost of R&D would be without the R&D tax credit. 
 
The total cost to the government to support the R&D tax credit program is given by  
 
1
2121
1
1 )1/()]()~~[()1/()~( −
∞∞
=
− +∆+−∆+=+− ∑∑∑ titititit
i tt
t
tt rRRRRrWW γγγγ . (12) 
 
The BFTB is given by the ratio of (10) and (12). In other words, we compute the ratio of the 
increases in R&D for all the firms along the entire trajectories towards their new steady states 
to the saving in government costs to support R&D along those trajectories, both appropriately 
discounted13.  
 
In our computation of the BFTB we use size-class specific short and long-run estimated price 
elasticities reported in section 4. We use two size classes: small firms with fewer than 250 
employees, and large firms with 250 and more employees. We report each time the BFTB 
computed for all firms with the specificities in the tax scheme that pertain to them and with 
their own price elasticities. We also report the BFTB separately for small and large firms. 
 
We run the following two experiments. In the first we increase the level-based provincial tax 
incentives ( 1γ ) by 10% (all rates appearing in PL and PO are increased by 10%), in the other 
we increase the increment-based provincial R&D tax credit ( 2γ ) by 10%. The result of the 
                                                 
13
 Because of the unbalanced nature of our sample, t0 is different for every firm. We take it to be the last year a 
firm is observed in the sample. In the simulation for the removal of the incremental R&D tax credit, we take as 
the reference year the last year this tax credit was in effect. 
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first experiment is plotted in fig. 1. For small firms the BFTB, i.e. the ratio of cumulative 
additional R&D to cumulative government expenses to support R&D, starts at a value much 
higher than one and slowly drops to a value that stays above 1 even after 20 years. Hence for 
small firms it is beneficial to support R&D by tax incentives. More R&D gets created than it 
costs the government to support it even after 20 years. For large firms, however, the BFTB 
starts at 3 but falls below 1. Already after seven years the cumulative additional R&D no 
longer covers the cumulative government costs to support this R&D. If we take all the firms 
in our sample, the BFTB falls below the bar of one after 13 periods. Thus if we consider the 
whole adjustment towards a new steady state, the level-based R&D tax incentives do not 
come out as very effective. The reason for this ineffectiveness is that level-based tax 
incentives contain a deadweight loss, namely the tax support on the R&D that would be done 
in the absence of all support. The importance of the deadweight can be computed by 
rewriting (12) as 
1
222111 )1/(])~()~(~)~()~(~[ −
∞
+∆−+∆−∆+−+−∑∑ titititititit
i t
rRRRRRR γγγγγγ . (13) 
 
The second term represents the deadweight loss connected to a change in the level-based 
R&D tax credit. In percentage of the total, the deadweight loss converges to 68% for small 
firms and to 82% for large firms.  
 
In the second experiment we increase only the incremental based R&D tax credit by 10%, i.e. 
the rate appearing in PI. In this case, there can also be a deadweight loss, the fourth term in 
(13), to the extent that we do not start from an initial steady state but that some R&D 
investment was already planned before the tax change. However, this deadweight loss is 
likely to be small. By simulating the effect of the tax change on R&D and government 
support for R&D for a period of 20 years, we find that the bang for the buck is about 2.98 for 
small firms and 2.79 for large firms. The incremental R&D tax credit is much more effective 
than the level based tax credit, and its effectiveness does not vary very much by firm size.   
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Figure 1 Evolution of the bang for the buck when increasing by 10% the level-based 
provincial rate of R&D tax credit 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in Quebec, using 
manufacturing firm data originating from R&D surveys, annual surveys of manufactures and 
administrative data. The data cover the years 1997 to 2003. We estimate the price 
responsiveness of R&D from a factor demand model for R&D with partial adjustment 
towards the steady state. From the estimated price elasticities we compute the bang for the 
buck for changes in the level-based and in the increment-based provincial R&D tax credits. 
We are especially interested in comparing the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives for small 
and large firms. 
 
Small firms in Quebec are slightly more responsive than large firms to price changes in the 
user cost of R&D driven by various kinds of tax credits aimed at stimulating R&D. Their 
estimated price elasticity of R&D investment is 0.14 in the short run and 0.19 in the long run 
(in absolute value). The estimated short-run elasticities are in line with those estimated by 
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Bernstein (1986), 0.13, and Dagenais, Mohnen, Therrien (2002), 0.07, for Canada. The long-
run elasticities are larger in those studies (0.30 and 1.09 resp.) because of a faster estimated 
adjustment speed. Our estimated bang for the buck differs sizeably from those estimated by 
Hall (1993) and Mairesse and Mulkay (2004) on US and French data respectively. Apart 
from possible differences in modeling and in the definition of the bang for the buck, the main 
reason for their much higher estimated effectiveness ratios (above 2) is likely to be due to the 
exclusive use of incremental R&D tax credits in France (until recently) and the United States. 
Our results on the differences between small and large firms regarding their sensitivities to 
R&D tax credits confirm the results on Dutch firms reported in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007).   
 
We show that there is a deadweight loss associated with level-based R&D tax incentives that 
is particularly acute for large firms. For small firms it is not sizeable enough to overcome the 
R&D additionality, at least not during quite a number of years after the initial tax change. 
Incremental R&D tax credits do not suffer from this deadweight loss and are from that 
perspective preferable to level-based tax incentives.  
 
If it wants to run an efficient fiscal policy in support of R&D, the province of Quebec would 
be advised to continue using both the incremental R&D tax credit and the level-based tax 
credits in favour of small firms. It is precisely small firms that have difficulty in getting 
outside financing for their R&D efforts. Of course, effectiveness is not the only nor the 
ultimate goal in giving R&D tax credits. An important consideration is the social rate of 
return on tax-supported R&D. It would be interesting in future work to compare the social 
returns on government supported R&D via tax credits and direct subsidies, on government 
supported and non-supported R&D, and on R&D support for large and small firms.  
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Appendix: Construction of the user cost of R&D 
 
The user cost of R&D is given by itRRi Brpu )( δ+= , where Rp is the R&D deflator, r is the 
opportunity cost of funds, δ is the R&D depreciation rate, and B is the B-index given by: 
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where titititititi FDPDFCPIPOPL ,,,,,, ,,,,, are defined as follows: 
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For medium sized firms (25 000 000 < assets < 50 000 000) 
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For large firms (assets > 50 000 000) 
 [ ]tptLtitpLtiLtiti sDcDwPL ,2,,12 ,,1,, )1( τ+−=  
 
 
PO: Quebec’s tax credits and superdeductions for university research, pre-competitive 
research and consortium research  
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This holds for small as well as for large firms. In the case of tax credit and superdeductions 
for university research, eligible expenditures are fixed at 80% of the value of sub-contracted 
work. 
 
 
PI: Quebec’s incremental tax credit 
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FC: Federal SR&ED tax credit  
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For federal SR&ED tax credit, eligible expenditures are current R&D expenditures and 
machinery and equipment expenditures. 
 
 
Medium sized firms : 25 000 000 < assets < 50 000 000 
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Large firms ( assets > 50 000 000) 
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PD : Quebec’s R&D expensing 
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FD : Federal R&D expensing  
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We assume that all firms are profitable, i.e. that they are able to take full advantage of 
all R&D tax credits and deductions. titi POPL ,, , and tiPI , are obtained not by the above 
formulas but by dividing the observed tax credit payments corresponding to these items by 
the corresponding R&D. tiFC , is computed using the statutory tax credit rates as in the above 
formula.  
 
Table A1 decomposes the user cost of R&D into its various components. All symbols 
and some key parameter values are given in table A2. 
 
 
 
Table A1. Annual average user cost of R&D, 1997-2003 (All firms) 
Year Firms )( δ+rPRt  PLit POit PIit PCit FCit Bit ur,it 
ur,it w/o 
tax 
credits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1997 1168 0,172 0,249 0,002 0,000 0,251 0,209 0,516 0,089 0,168 
1998 1265 0,183 0,243 0,003 0,000 0,246 0,208 0,523 0,096 0,179 
1999 1304 0,187 0,267 0,003 0,000 0,270 0,217 0,485 0,091 0,182 
2000 1909 0,197 0,271 0,005 0,050 0,326 0,197 0,462 0,091 0,194 
2001 2092 0,166 0,288 0,002 0,058 0,349 0,207 0,405 0,067 0,159 
2002 2400 0,176 0,299 0,002 0,057 0,357 0,208 0,393 0,069 0,169 
2003 2657 0,179 0,269 0,001 0,055 0,325 0,220 0,417 0,075 0,172 
Note: ur,it,  the user cost of R&D in column (9) is the product of column (2) and Bit, the B- index 
in column (8). PLit, POit, PIit, FCit and the Bit are described above. PCit in column (6) is the 
sum of columns (3) to (5), i.e. all forms of R&D tax credits in Quebec. Column (10) is the user 
cost of R&D without provincial and federal R&D tax credits.  
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Table A2. Symbols and some parameter values* 
Variable Value Description 
Asseti,t
   Asset of firm i in year t ; 
cf
1 35% First bracket rate for federal SR&ED tax credit; 
cf
2 20% Second bracket rate for federal SR&ED tax credit;  
cpI  15% Quebec' s incremental R&D tax credit rate; 
cpL
1  
1997-2002: 40% 
2003:          35% 
First bracket rate for Quebec's salaries of researchers tax 
credit;  
cpL
1,1  
1997-2002: 40% to 20% 
2003:         35% to 17.5% 
First bracket variable rate for Quebec's salaries of 
researchers tax credit applying to firms with assets between 
CAN $25 000 000 and CAN $50 000 000;  
cpL
2 
1997-2002: 20% 
2003:          17.5% 
Second bracket rate for Quebec' s salaries of researchers tax 
credit; 
cpO  
1997-2002: 40%  
2003:          35% 
Quebec's tax credit rate for university research, 
precompetitive research and dues paid to consortium  
D1i,t  
- D1i,t = 1 
- D1i,t = 0 
-R&D performer claimed superdeduction for salaries 
-R&D performer claimed tax credit  for salaries 
D2i,t  
- D2i,t = 1 
 
- D2i,t =0 
-R&D performer claimed superdeduction for university, 
precompetitive or consortium research 
-R&D performer claimed tax credit for university, 
precompetitive or consortium research 
D3i,t  
- D3i,t =1 
 
- D3i,t =0 
-R&D performer claimed superdeduction based on the 
increase in R&D expenditures 
-R&D performer claimed tax credit based on the increase in 
R&D expenditures 
Rf  CAN $2 000 000 First bracket ceiling for federal SR&ED tax credit;  
Ri,t   Total R&D spending of firm i in year t;  
Rp  CAN $2 000 000 
First bracket ceiling for Quebec’s salaries of researchers 'tax 
credit;  
si,t 
E   
Proportion of Quebec' s subsidies for equipment in total 
R&D of firm i in year t 
spI,t  190% Quebec's superdeduction incremental rate 
spL,,t 
1  460% 
First bracket rate for Quebec' s superdeduction for salaries 
and wages;  
spL,,t 
1,1  between 460% and 230% 
First bracket variable rate for Quebec' s superdeduction for 
salaries and wages applying to firms with assets between 
CAN $25 ML and 50 ML ; 
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Variable Value Description 
spL,,t 
2  230% 
Second bracket rate for Quebec' s superdeduction for 
salaries and wages; 
spO,,t  460% 
Quebec' s superdeduction for university, pre-competitive 
and consortium research; 
θ 
Applied in 1999: 
 125% 
Depreciation deduction rate of the acquisition costs of 
machinery and equipment 
τf  
SMEs:  22,12%** 
Large firms: 22,12% 
Federal corporate income tax rate 
τp  
SME’s:  
 8,90%*** 
Large firms:  8,90% 
Quebec's corporate income tax rate 
τ  τf +τp  
Combined federal and province of Quebec corporate 
income tax rate 
Wi,t
B   Proportion of land and building expenses in total R&D;  
Wi,t
C   Proportion of current R& D expenditure in total R&D;  
Wi,t
Co   Proportion of dues paid to a research consortium;  
Wi,t
E   
Proportion of machinery and equipment expenses in total 
R& D;  
Wi,t
L   Proportion of labor costs in total R&D;  
Wi,t
Pr    Proportion of precompetitive research project expenses; 
Wi,t
Un   Proportion of university research contract expenses;  
zB   Present value of depreciation of R&D building 
zE   
Present value of depreciation of R&D machinery and 
equipment 
*
  The values of the variables given in the table are limited to the study period i.e., for 
the years 1997 to 2003. The subscripts i and t represent the firm and time, 
respectively. 
** For the years 1997 to 2002, a federal corporate income tax rate of 13.12% applied to 
the first CAN $ 200 000 of the taxable income of SME’s. In 2003, the ceiling of CAN 
$ 200 000 was raised to CAN $ 225 000.  
**
      For the years 1997 and 1998, a Quebec,s corporate income tax rate of 5.75% applied 
to the first CAN $ 400 000 of the taxable income of SME’s.                              
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